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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
THE MISSOURI WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
By MAURICE L. STEWART
The writer of this article does not intend to prophecy as to the con-
structions which the Missouri Courts will place on the various pro-
visions of this new act and the problems arising under its provisions,
but on the contrary, acting upon the presumption that a majority of the
readers are unfamiliar with its provisions, he will survey briefly the
various provisions of the act as a whole, and then point out the con-
structions placed by other courts on two provisions-namely, the clauses
"personal injury or death by accident" and "arising out of and in the
course of the employment," provisions which are not only in the Mis-
souri Act, but are to be found also in the acts of a majority of the other
states having a Workmen's Compensation Law.
THE GENERAL SCOPE OF THE ACT
The Missouri Act was promulgated by the Fifty-third General As-
sembly in 1925,1 but because of the filing of referendum petitions with
the required number of signatures, the Act did not go into effect at that
time and was submitted to the people at the election in November, 1926.
The Act was approved, and in the opinion of North T. Gentry, At-
torney-General, it became a law November 16, 1926, and that after that
date it was proper for the governor to appoint the members of the com-
mission, although because of the provision contained in section 79, the
Act did not go into operation on employers until fifty-four days after
November 16.2
The Act is one which may be classed as elective and is not compul-
sory. Neither the employer nor the employee is compelled to accept its
provisions, but both are conclusively presumed to have accepted the
Act unless prior to the accident written notice of election to reject the
Act is filed with the Workmen's Compensation Commission.,
The constitutionality of elective acts has been attacked on many
grounds-that they deprive the injured and his dependents of the right
of trial by jury, that they confer judicial powers on administrative
bodies, that they violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they de-
prive employers of common-law defenses-but they have been upheld
'Laws of Mo. 1925, pp. 375-407.
'See Xn SAINT Louis LAW REmw 55 for opinion in full.
"Sec. 2.
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repeatedly by both State and Federal Courts.4  The United States Su-
preme Court, in New York Central Ry. v. White,5 said, "The common
law bases the employer's liability for injuries to the employee on the
ground of negligence; but negligence is merely a disregard for some
duty imposed by law; and the nature and extent of the duty may be
modified by legislation with corresponding changes in the test of negli-
gence." Continuing in reference to the abolition of the employer's com-
mon law defenses, the court said, "No person has a vested interest in
any rule of law, entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged
for his benefit," and referring to the abolition of the defense of "fellow
service" the court said, "It needs no argument to show that such a rule
is subject to modification or abrogation by a State upon proper occasion.
The same may be said with respect to the general doctrine of assumption
of risk, . . . so, also with respect to contributory negligence." In this
connection it is also to be noted that in most instances even acts having
compulsory provisions have been sustained.6
The Act provides, section 3, that if both the employer and employee
elect to accept the provisions of the Act, the employer shall be liable
"irrespective of negligence," to furnish compensation for the personal
injury or the death of the employee by "accident arising out of or in the
scope of his employment," and shall be released from all other liability
therefor, whether to the employee or to other persons. That, "the
rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall exclude all
other rights and remedies of such employee, his wife, her husband,
parents, personal representatives, dependents, heirs or next kin, at com-
mon law or otherwise, on account of such accidental injury or death,
except such rights and remedies as are not provided for by the Act."
If the injury is such that a third person may also be liable to the em-
ployee or his dependents, the employer is subrogated to such right of
action of the employee or his dependents against the third person. Any
recovery of such employer in excess of the compensation and expenses
of such recovery is to be paid to the employee or his dependents, and
shall be treated as an advance on future installments of compensation.
The provisions of the Act, except as to cases exclusively covered by
the federal law, apply to all injuries received in the state, and all in-
juries received out of the state under a contract of employment made
in the state, unless the contract of employment otherwise provides.7
' Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243 U. S. 210, 61 L. Ed. 678; N. Y. C. Ry. v. White, 243
U. S. 188, 61 L. Ed. 667; Croks v. Tazewell Coal Co., 263 Ill. 343; Deibeikes v.
Link Belt Co., 261 I1. 454; Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 607.
'243 U. S. 188, 61 L. Ed. 667.
'Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 61 L. Ed. 685.
'Sec. 12.
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Employers are divided into two classes-major and minor. The
major employer is one who has more than ten men regularly employed.,
Every major and every minor employer whose occupation has been
deemed hazardous to employees are conclusively presumed to have
accepted the provisions of the Act unless they have filed notice of their
election to reject the act with the Commission in accordance with sec-
tions 1 and 4 (c), respectively.
If employers who fall within the provisions of the act file notices of
rejecting the act, they forfeit the defenses of "negligence of a fellow-
servant," and "that the employee has assumed the risk of his employ-
ment," in any action for damages for personal injury or death of em-
ployee in course of the employment brought against them. However,
an employer who accepts the provisions of the act does not forfeit the
above defenses, and may assert them in an action brought against him
by an employee who has rejected the act.
Certain classes of employments are not within the scope of the act.10
Among them are employments by the state, and by governmental subdi-
visions thereof, farm and domestic servants, casual employees, employ-
ments in nature of home manufacture, and minor employments where
the occupation has not been determined by the Commission to be
hazardous. Provision is also made under Section 4 (e) whereby any
employer who has accepted the act may exempt himself from the pro-
vision of the act as to any individual employee whose occupation is non-
hazardous. However, any of the exempt employers may bring them-
selves within the provisions of the act by filing notice of their election
to accept the act with the Commission, and posting notices of their ac-
ceptance in accordance with provision of section 5, subdivision 5.
In this connection, it is of interest to note that the term "employee"
as used in the act does not include persons whose average yearly wage
exceeds thirty-six hundred dollars, and that, for the purposes of the
act, minors are made of full age. 1 The Missouri courts have declared
it competent for the legislature to declare a minor of full age for pur-
poses of making contracts, and this decision would seem to establish
by analogy the legality of the provision in the compensation Act as to
minors.
2
PENALTIES WHICH AFFECT THE AMOUNT OF THE COMPENSATION
No compensation may be received if the injury is due to the em-
ployee's "intentional self-inflicted injury," but the burden of proof of
'Sec. 4. 'Sec. 4 (d).
"Sec. 5. "Sec. 7 (a).
Dickens v. Carr, 84 Mo. 658. 'Sec. 3.
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self-infliction is upon the person contesting the claim to compensation. 13
What amounts to an "intentional self-inflicted injury" is an uncertain-
problem. Suicide is such a self-inflicted injury and not compensable
unless it is the consequence of a mental derangement resulting from
accident in the course of the employment. However, mere contributory
negligence has been held not a bar to compensation. 14
If the injury is caused by the failure of the employer to comply with
a provision of the statute or lawful order of the Commission the com-
pensation is to be increased fifteen per cent,'15 and if the employer em-
ploys a minor in violation of law, the compensation is to be increased
fifty per cent.16 However, when the injury is caused by the "willful"
failure of the employee to use safety devices provided, or failure to obey
any reasonable rule adopted by the employer for the safety of the em-
ployees, when such rule has been posted, and the employer has made a
diligent effort to cause his employees to use such safety devices, the
compensation is to be reduced fifteen per cent. 7
It is also to be noted that the Act provides that no compensation is pay-
able for death or disability in so far as it may be caused or aggravated
by the unreasonable refusal of the employee to submit to operation,
where the risk is inconsiderable in view of the seriousness of the
injury."8
COMPENSATION
The provisions for compensation and death benefit, and to whom
such benefit is payable are too long and detailed to justify space here,
and in addition, they are for the most part self-explanatory.
In general, the act provides, that the employer shall furnish medical
treatment not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars in amount for
the first six months and for such additional treatment thereafter as the
commission may determine necessary in case of death, funeral expenses
of deceased not to exceed one hundred fifty dollars in amount and
reasonable expense of last sickness not to exceed two hundred and
fifty dollars, and pay the compensation or death benefit."9 The com-
pensation is 66 2/3 per cent of the average weekly wage of the em-
ployee of the preceding year, not to exceed twenty dollars a week and
not less than six dollars a week, for a period of weeks determined in
accordance with the elaborate scheme determining the period for the
various injuries enumerated in the act.20 The "waiting period" is three
'Gifford v. Patterson, 165 N. Y. S. 1043.
"Sec. 3. " Sec. 22.lSe. 3. "*Sec. 13 (d).
"Sec. 13. " Sec. 14 (b) ; Secs. 15-22, inclusive.
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days, and "no compensation is payable for the first three days or less
of disability unless the disability lasts longer than four weeks." 21
Compensation under the Missouri Act like that under the Acts of the
other States is to be deemed in lieu of wages, and is to be paid in the
same period as the employee's wages were paid prior to the injury, and
in all cases at least once every two weeks. 22 Provision is made whereby
the compensation awarded may be commuted and paid in a lump sum in
cases where it appears that such commutation will inure to the best
interest of the employee, will avoid undue expense or hardship to
either party, that the employee or dependent is about to leave the United
States, or that employer has sold or otherwise disposed of the greater
part of his business.2  However, the act says that "commutation is a
departure from the normal method of payment and is to be allowed
only when it clearly appears that some unusual circumstances warrant
such a departure."
The amount awarded is not assignable, is exempt from attachment,
garnishment, and execution. It cannot be the subject of set-off or
counterclaim, and in case of insolvency or levy against the employer or
insurer, it is entitled to the same priority as a claim for wages. Reason-
able attorney's fees, if necessary, may be included in the award, but the
amount of such attorney's fees is subject to regulation by the
commission. 24
INSURANCE
All employers, electing to accept the provisions of the act must in-
sure their entire liability with some authorized insurer, unless the em-
ployer desires to carry the entire liability himself and is able
to satisfy the commission as to his financial ability to do so. If the
employer fails to insure, the employee may recover as if the employer
had rejected the act, the compensation being commuted and immediately
payable. An elaborate scheme for the regulation of such insurers and
their rates is provided for in sections 28 to 32, inclusive.
When the employer secures insurance, the insurer becomes primarily
liable, and the employer is secondarily and indirectly liable .2  Service
on the employer gives the commission jurisdiction over both the em-
ployer and the insurer and appearance of the employer constitutes an
appearance of the insurer in any proceeding, provided that after ap-
pearance of the insurer, the insurer is entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings. 26
' Sec. 14 (a). ' Sec. 14 (b).
' Sec. 48. ,Sec. 23.
Sec. 27. "Sec. 27.
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The employer and the employee can with the approval of the com-
mission, enter into an agreement as to benefits or insurance in lieu of
compensation and insurance under the provisions of the act. Such
plan, however, must confer benefits equivalent to those conferred in the
act, and must not require contribution from the employer. Appeal will
lie to the Commission from any decision made under such substituted
plan, and such a plan may be terminated by the superintendent of in-
surance where it appears that it is not fairly administered, or its
operation discloses latent defects threatening its solvency.
27
The parties to a controversy may make a voluntary settlement, pro-
vided that no agreement by the employee or his dependents to waive his
rights under this act shall be valid nor any compromise will be valid till
approved by the commission . 2  As a further limitation, the section also
provides that no such agreement shall be valid unless made after seven
days from date of death or injury. Similar sections in the acts of
other states have done much to lighten the burdens of the commissions,
and, if not abused, the Missouri provision for voluntary agreement
should prove to be of similar value.
THE COMMIssION
The Act provides for a Workmen's Compensation Commission com-
posed of three men, one of whom is to be learned in law, appointed by
the Governor by and with the consent of the Senate. 29  The terms of
the members of the Commission, except the first appointees whose terms
shall be two, four, and six years respectively, shall be six years. At
least one of the members must be from each of the two dominant politi-
cal parties, and one because of previous vocation shall be classed as .a
representative of employees and another as a representative of em-
ployers. They may be removed as members of public service com-
missions are removed, a procedure regulated by sec. 10414 R. S. Mo.
1919,10 and vacancies may be filled by the Governor for the unexpired
term.
Sec. 33. Sec. 35.
Sec. 5&
* Sec. 10414 R. S. Mo. 1919:
"The governor may remove any commissioner for inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or misconduct in office, giving him a copy of the charges against him
and an opportunity of being publicly heard in person or by counsel, in his
own defense, upon not less than ten days' notice. If such commissioner
shall be removed, the governor shall file in the office of the secretary of state
a complete statement of all charges made against such commissioner, and his
findings thereon, together with a complete record of the proceedings. The
legislature also shall have the power, by a two-thirds vote of all members
elected to each house, after ten days' notice in writing of the charges and a
public hearing, to remove any one or more of said commissioners from office
for dereliction of duty, or corruption, or incompetency."
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The commission is empowered to make such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purpose of the act.3' The commission
or any commissioner has power to issue process, subpoena witnesses,
administer oaths, examine books and papers and require the production
thereof, and to cause the deposition of any witness to be taken. Any
person at any hearing or proceeding failing to obey a command or sub-
poena without reasonable cause, or refusing to be sworn or examined,
or refusing to produce a book or paper or swear to his deposition, is
guilty of a misdemeanor and may be prosecuted therefor in the courts
of competent jurisdiction, but no provision is made whereby the com-
mission itself may punish as for contempt such disobedience of its
orders.
3 2
It is the duty of every employer whether he has accepted or rejected
the act to notify the commission within ten days after he has knowledge
of any accident resulting in personal injury, and he shall within thirty
days file a complete report of such injury or death, such report to be
prepared in accordance with the rules of the commission."3 On re-
ceipt of such notice, the commission shall send to the employer and to
the employee or his dependents a form of agreement to pay and accept
compensation, and if the employer refuses to execute the agreement to
pay compensation, the act provides that "the commission shall assist
the person who claims to be entitled thereto, in filing his claim and
securing an early adjudication thereof." If the parties reach an agree-
ment they shall file a report of the facts and their agreement, and if ap-
proved by them the commission is empowered to issue an award
thereon."34
It is the duty of the injured person to notify the employer by written
notice, of any injury and its nature as soon as practicable,'and not later
than thirty days after the accident, unless the commission shall find
good cause for failing to give notice in thirty days, or that the employer
was not injured by such delay.83 No proceeding can be maintained
under the act unless such claim is filed with the commission within six
months after the injury or death, or in case payments have been made,
the claim must be filed within six months after the last payment.80
In cases where the employer and employee fail to agree, or have made
an agreement and subsequently disagree, either party may make an ap-
plication for a hearing before the commission. At such hearings, the
proceedings are intended, by those who framed the act and as expressed
in section 51, to be informal, summary and conducted "without regard
SI Sec. 63. 'Sec. 52.
Sec. 34. ' Sec. 36.
Sec. 38. 'Sec. 39.
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to technical rules of evidence." However, the obligation to establish
a case is incumbent upon the claimant as in judicial proceedings. Courts
of other states have said, when construing similar provisions, that the
burden rests on claimant to show by competent evidence that an injury
has occurred by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment.
The commission or any of its members may hear any party at issue
and his witnesses. The evidence is to be taken by a stenographer, and
an award made. A copy of the award, findings of fact and rulings of
law are then to be sent to the parties in dispute and the employer's
insurer.3 7
The commission may of its own motion, or upon the application of a
party in interest, on ground of change in condition, review any award
after due notice to the parties interested. No such review affects any
compensation already paid, however. If such application for review is
filed within ten days from date of award, the full commission, if the
first hearing was not before the full commission, may review the evi-
dence and make an award. 38
The final award of the commission is conclusive and binding unless a
party to the dispute appeals to the circuit court within thirty days. The
appeal may be taken by filing notice of the appeal with the commission.
After receipt of notice of appeal, it becomes the duty of the commis-
sion to return under certificate all documents and papers on file in the
case, a transcript of the evidence, the findings and the award, and these
papers compose the record of the case.3 9
The powers of the circuit court on appeal are limited by section forty-
four. No additional evidence may be heard, and the findings of fact
of the commission are conclusive in the absence of fraud. The court
is limited to a review of questions of law, and can modify, reverse, re-
move or set aside an award on four grounds only, namely, that "com-
mission acted without or in excess of its power," that the "award was
procured by fraud," that the findings of fact do not support the award,
and that there is insufficient "competent" evidence to warrant making
the award. No special provision for procedure in appeal from de-
cisions of circuit courts is made, except that workmen's compensation
cases "shall have precedence over all other cases except election con-
tests," the section reading "that appeals from the circuit court shall be
allowed the same as in civil actions."
The phrase "sufficient competent evidence" in subsection four of sec-
tion forty-four is worthy of consideration for it indicates that although
section fifty-one reads:
Sc 41 Sc 2.Sc 4
" Sec. 41. " Sec. 42. * Sec. 44.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss4/3
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
All proceedings before the commission shall be simple, infor-
mal and summary, and without regard to technical rules of evi-
dence, and no defect or irregularity therein shall invalidate the
same,
there is a distinction between "competent evidence" and "without re-
gard for technical rules of evidence." The "hearsay rule" has generally
been considered not a "technical rule of evidence" as the term is used
in compensation laws in sections similar to section fifty-one of the Mis-
souri Act.
The act provides that "any notice required under this act shall be
deemed properly given and served when sent by registered mail . . . .
notice may also be given and served in like manner as summons in civil
action.1 40 Referring to that section, Attorney General North T.
Gentry, in an opinion rendered to the commission, says, "While we do
not hold that notice sent by registered mail would be insufficient, yet we
believe the better practice would be for a notice in the form of a sum-
mons to be issued by the commission and served in manner provided
by law for service in civil actions."
WHAT IS AN "AccIDENT?"
It is to be noted tlhat the act provides only for compensation under
its provisions "for personal injury or death by accident," and in section
7b gives the following definition of "accident" and "personal injury":
The word "accident" as used in this act shall, unless a different
meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to
mean an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly
and violently with or without human fault and producing at
the time objective symptoms of an injury. The term "injury"
and "personal injuries" shall mean only violence to the phy-
sical structure of the body and such disease of infection as
naturally results therefrom. The said terms shall in no case
be construed to include occupational disease in any form, nor
shall they be construed to include any contagious or infec-
tious disease contracted during the course of the employment,
nor shall they include death due to natural causes occurring
while the workman is at work. "Death" when mentioned as
a basis for the right to compensation means only death result-
ing from such violence and its resultant effects occurring with-
in three hundred weeks after the accident . . ..
Similar provisions are to be found in a majority of the acts in other
states, but some confusion in the decisions exists as to what is an "acci-
, Se. 47.
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dent." Moreover, there is to be considered a distinction between "per-
sonal injury" and "personal injury by accident."
This distinction is aptly illustrated by Lord Reading in Trim Joint
District School v. Kelly, when he said, "For example, if a workman
became blind in consequence of an explosion at the factory, that would
constitute an injury by accident but if in consequence of the nature of
his employment, his sight was gradually impaired and eventually he
became blind, that would be an injury, but not an injury by accident." 41
Such a distinction was evidently in the minds of the framers of the
Missouri Act when they inserted the words "happening suddenly and
violently," and expressly excluded occupational diseases in the definition
of "accident." However, in the absence of such an express restriction,
an occupational disease has not been considered compensable, 2 except
in states where the term "personal injury" is not further qualified by
the words "accident" or "accidental." 43
In the following cases the injury has been held accidental. Assault
by an intoxicated fellow employee;"4 assault by section foreman on
laborer;45 assault by pupils on a teacher in an industrial school;4 mur-
der of cashier for purposes of robbery ;47 asphixiation by noxious
gases ;48 death from heart attack caused by breathing dust laden air;49
injury occurring while assisting employer in defending person and prop-
erty ;5o suicide resulting from an accident can be accidental ;1 and sui-
cide where employee jumped from window as a result of an accident re-
sulting in a mental derangement was accidental.52  Injuries resulting
from exposure to elements, if the elements are the same as those to
which the general public is exposed, are not accidental, but exposure
because of particular duties may be accidental. 8
As may be seen from the foregoing cases, it is difficult to lay down
hard and fast rules which will be applicable to the term "accident" in all
,(1914) A. C. 667.
Workmen's Compensation Acts, C. J. p. 67, note 38.
'Johnson's Case, 217 Mass. 388; Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 487; Steel v. Cam-
mel Co., (1905) 2 K. B. 232.
" In re Employer's Liability Assurance Corporation, 102 N. E. 697.
"Western Indemnity Company v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 Pac. 398.
"Trim Joint District School v. Kelly, (1914) A. C. 667.
"Nesbit v. Rayne, (1910) 2 K. B. 689.
"Tarr v. Hecla Coal & Coke Co., 265 Pac. 519, 109 AtI. 224; General Am. Tank
Co. v. Weirich, 133 N. E. 39; Matthiessen & Higler Zinc Co. v. Ind. Board, 284
111. 378.
"Carrol v. Ind. Com., 69 Colo. 473, 195 Pac. 1097.
"Baum v. Ind. Com., 288 Ill. 516, 123 N. E. 625.
"Withers v. London B. & Sc. Co. Ry., (1916) 2 K. B. 772.
"Sponatski's Case, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N. E. 466.
Larke v. Hancock Ins. Co., 90 Conn. 303, 97 Atl. 320; In re Harradan, 66
Ind. App. 298, 118 N. E. 142; State ex rel. v. District Court, 129 Minn. 502, 153
N. W. 119; Day v. Trimmer, 176 App. Div. 724, 162 N. Y. S. 602.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss4/3
268 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
cases. The decision in each case must depend essentially upon its own
particular facts, and one court has said, "In short, the common mean-
ing of the word is ruled neither by logic nor by etymology, but by cus-
tom, and no formula will precisely express its usage in all cases." 54
WHAT "ARISES OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF His EMPLOYMfENT?"
These words like the words "personal injury or death by accident,"
are words common to a majority of the Workmen's Compensation Acts.
They serve to exclude the risks to which all people are equally exposed
and limit the compensable injuries to those which may be traced in
some special degree to the particular employment. Courts have generally
considered "out of" and "in the course of" as phrases with different
meanings, and that the concurrence of both is essential to recovery.05
The words "arising out of" referring to origin or cause of accident, be-
ing descriptive in character, while the words "in the course of" refer to
time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place, and
refer to character or quality of the accident. 5
Any attempt to analyze the theory of the various cases arising under
this clause is beyond the scope of this article. The following are
among the cases which have been held as "arising out of and in the
scope of the employment:" Injury sustained while the workman was
answering the telephone although there was no showing as to whether
the call was a personal or a business call was held to "arise out of em-
ployment" ;57 so also where the building was wrecked and its contents
were particularly subject to the strength of a tornado the injury resulted
from defects of building;58 injury from lightning;"" but the injury by
lightning was not in course of employment where a section hand was
under shelter during a storm ;6O injury resulting from apple thrown in
play;61 injury to employee who fell downstairs during working hours
was incident to employment ;82 so also in the case of an insurance sales-
man slipping on the ice ;83 but injury to an employee caused by slipping
on a banana peel while about the employer's business was not com-
Trim Joint School District v. Kelly, supra 46.
McNubb's Case, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697.
"Fitzgerald v. Clark, 1 B. W. C. C. 197; Deitzen Coal Co. v. Ind. Board, 279
IlL 11, 116 N. E. 684.
"Holland Sugar Co. v. Shraluka, (Ind.) 116 N. E. 330.
" Cen. Ill. Pub. Service Com. v. Ind. Com., 291 IIl. 256, 126 N. E. 144; Reid v.
Automatic Electric Co., 179 N. W. 323.
'Andrew v. Failsworth (1904) 2 K. B. 32; De Luka v. Park Com., 94 Conn.
7, 107 At. 11; State Road Com. v. Ind. Com. (Utah) 190 Pac. 544.
" Klawinska v. Lakeshore, 185 Mich. 643, 153 N. W. 213.
'Leon Bruno v. Champlain Silk Co., 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711.
' In re O'Brien (Mass.) 117 N. E. 619.
"In re Harraden, 118 N. E. 142.
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pensable as all the pedestrians were subject to the same risk.64 Going to
and from work is generally not within the scope of the employment, but
there are many exceptions arising from the particular facts of the
case. A salesman crossing the street to call on a customer on the way
home from work, 5 and a workman going to a locker room after quitting
time were within the scope of their employment.6 6 Horseplay is
generally not within the scope of the employment, 67 as in the case where
an employee in play directed the hose of a compressed air apparatus in-
to the anus of a co-employee who was instantly killed ;68 but an injury
which was occasioned by horseplay in a washroom when the employee
came in contact with an uncovered electric wire was compensable.6 9
The foregoing cases indicate that the question of whether an acci-
dent "arises out of or in the course of the employment" is dependent
almost entirely upon the particular facts of each case. In general, it
may be said that the injury arises in the course of the employment when
it occurs while a man is doing what he may reasonably be doing while
employed, and at a time within which he may reasonably be considered
to be employed; and that an injury arises "out of the employment"
when it appears that the duties which he is doing would be considered
by reasonable minds to be incidental to his employment.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion to this explanatory article the author wishes to call
attention to the fact that the act is in its very nature a departure from
the principles of common law liability which are predicated upon "fault,"
that the act contemplates an entirely different basis of liability which is
frequently referred to as the "trade risk" theory, and that this change
of principle is worthy of consideration in understanding problems
which may arise under its provisions.
The "trade risk" idea had its origin in a realization by economists
and legislators that in a large percentage of cases in which injuries oc-
cur neither the employer nor the employee was negligent, but that the
injuries were to be expected as an incident to production, and there-
fore, that the cost of such injuries should be included in the cost of
production, and assessed against the consumer in the price of the finished
product rather than make the employee who was less able financially,
bear the entire burden. Such a basic principle tends to explain the
"Chapman v. Pearn, 9 B. W. C. C. 224.
" Bachman v. Watertown, (Ind. App.) 121 N. E. 8.
" Chfudzinski v. Standard Oil Co., 162 N. Y. 225.
" Fissering v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 690, 158 Pac. 215.
" Payne v. Ind. Com. 295 Ill. 388, 129 N. E. 122.
"Hollenbach Co. v. Holleokeh, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W. 152.
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clause "liable irrespective of negligence," the idea that compensation is
in lieu of wages, the reluctance to commute the compensation, the simple
rules of evidence and procedure, and the almost compulsory insurance,
although it strikes a stumbling block in the fact that occupational 'dis-
eases are excluded, it is of value in reconciling and understanding the
purpose of the various provisions of the act.
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